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Abstract
We present a new measure of liquidity known as “latent liquidity” and apply it to a unique corporate
bond database. Latent liquidity is defined as the weighted average turnover of investors who hold a
bond, where the weights are the fractional investor holdings. It can be used to measure liquidity in
markets with sparse transactions data. This measure exhibits relationships with bond characteristics
similar to those of other trade-based measures. For bonds that trade frequently, our measure has
predictive power for both transaction costs and the price impact of trading, over and above trading
activity and bond-specific characteristics thought to be related to liquidity.
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1 Introduction
An investor holding a security or considering the purchase of a security is exposed to liquidity,
or, more precisely, the lack of it. The conventional “reduced-form” definition of liquidity is the
gap between the fundamental value of a security and the price at which the security is actually
transacted: high liquidity implies that this gap is small, and vice versa. In this paper, our goal
is to understand the determinants of liquidity and its cross-sectional variability in the context
of relatively illiquid markets. However, while liquidity is easy to define in theoretical terms, its
empirical measurement in an accurate and reliable manner is quite difficult, except in markets
that are relatively very liquid. This is because most commonly used metrics of liquidity rely on
transactional information, such as volume and trading spreads, with relatively high frequency, which
are unavailable when the asset in question is illiquid. For this reason, we first propose a measure
for liquidity that does not require such transactions data. We call this measure latent liquidity,
since it measures liquidity the way a typical “sell-side” dealer thinks about liquidity: it measures
the accessibility of a security from sources where the security is currently being held. We apply
this new measure of liquidity to try to understand the determinants of liquidity in one of the most
well-known, but illiquid markets in the world - the market for U.S. corporate bonds. Additionally,
for bonds that trade, we demonstrate that our measure has predictive power both for transaction
costs and for the price impact of trading, over and above liquidity measures such as the trading
volume, and bond specific characteristics such as age, amount outstanding, rating class and coupon.
The broad empirical issue of liquidity has been covered by many papers in both the equity and
bond market literatures. In the equity markets, two key questions receiving a great deal of attention
recently are first, whether liquidity differentials explain the cross-sectional variation in returns, and
second, whether liquidity risk is priced.1 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrah-
1Liquidity risk is the uncertainty of how wide or narrow the gap between fundamental value and the transactions
price of a security will be at any point in time. For all investors, current and potential, liquidity risk is a real
risk that they bear, and hence may be “priced”, if it has a systematic component. Every transaction is essentially
a negative NPV project for the “buy-side” investor, because she is always transacting at a price worse than the
security’s fundamental value. However, if the investor knew how negative the NPV would be, then this would not be
a risk - the investor could simply perform his asset allocation optimization by factoring in the transaction costs. The
risk comes from not knowing how far off the investor will transact in relation to the fundamental value of the asset
she is buying or selling.
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manyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998),
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) find positive relationships between stock returns and
overall liquidity as measured by spreads, depth, and volume. Meanwhile Chordia, Subrahmanyam
and Anshuman (2001) find a negative relationship between liquidity and expected returns, while
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) find no relationship. Finally, Huberman and Halka (2001), Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), Sadka (2004), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) examine the more
relevant question of whether liquidity risk is a systematic factor.
Several authors have investigated measures of liquidity that do not rely on high-frequency data.
Typically, these metrics rely only on daily volume and return data and can be related to Kyle’s
(1985) concept of the price impact of trading. Examples include the Amivest measure proposed
by Amivest Capital Management, and the related Amihud (2002) measure, that are both based on
absolute return and trading volume. The relationship between these measures (and their variants)
and traditional microstructure-based measures is investigated by Hasbrouck (2005) who shows that
the Amihud measure is a robust measure of price impact. Using this measure, Amihud (2002) shows
there is an illiquidity premium in stock returns since the expected market illiquidity is correlated
with stock excess return. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) also use this measure to investigate the
various channels of the liquidity effect on stock returns in a unified liquidity-adjusted capital asset
pricing model.
In the debt markets, much of the literature on liquidity has focused on the transactional
characteristics of corporate debt. For example, Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), Hong and Warga
(2000), Schultz (2001), and Hotchkiss, Warga, and Jostava (2002) use the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) database to study bid-ask spreads and trading volume in
corporate bonds. Meanwhile Hotchkiss and Ronen (1999) and Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri
(2000) use the Fixed Income Pricing System (FIPS) database of high-yield bonds, collected by
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to study various aspects of liquidity and
informational efficiency in the corporate bond market. Recently, there have been attempts to
quantify transaction costs in the market. Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2005) use
NAIC data in order to estimate round-trip transaction costs for a limited set of bonds using a
2
signed-variable approach. Using the same data-set, Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2005) establish
that transaction costs have decreased after the introduction of centralized reporting of transactions
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 2002.
The role of liquidity in the context of credit markets has been studied by several authors, who
attempt to explain the yield spread on corporate bonds or credit default swaps. Several authors,
including Duffee (1999), Duffie and Singleton (1997) Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001),
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2003), Huang and
Huang (2003), Perraudin and Taylor (2003), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2005), Edwards, Harris and
Piwowar (2006), Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004), Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2004), Longstaff,
Mithal and Neis (2005), and De Jong and Driessen (2005) all present evidence of the non-default
component of these spreads, and attribute at least part of it to illiquidity effects. However, in the
absence of direct measures of liquidity for most corporate bonds, most researchers, so far, have
been forced to rely on proxies such as age, notional amount oustanding, industry category, and
credit risk. In the case of the most liquid bonds, some data on bid-ask spreads are used, but this
approach is biased in favor of the most liquid bonds given the lack of trading in most US corporate
bonds, as we document in detail below.2 While these measures may be correlated with liquidity,
it would be far better to obtain a more direct measure of liquidity, since these proxies for liquidity
may be quite imperfect in the absence of frequent trading.
A common feature among all the empirical research on liquidity, irrespective of the markets
studied, is that they use transactions data, such as trading volume and the bid-ask spread, to
measure liquidity. This approach is feasible in markets that are reasonably liquid and have relatively
continuous trading activity. However, this is not always a realistic option, in general, since the most
interesting markets to study liquidity, or more precisely, the lack of it, are those where liquidity is
a problem, i.e., in asset markets that lack liquidity, such as the real estate market, the art market,
the corporate bond market, to name a few. In general, most assets in these markets do not trade
regularly; hence transactions data are very sparse, for all but a handful of the assets in these
markets, since there is no trading activity for the bulk of the assets for several consecutive months.
2For example, Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2006) show that of the 70,000+ corporate bonds outstanding in
2004, less than 17,000 experienced more than 9 trades that year.
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Hence, conventional measures of liquidity such as the bid-ask spread and trade count are difficult to
employ in these markets, except for the most liquid segment. Therefore, studies that use proxies of
liquidity based on transactions data in these markets inevitably end up focusing on only the most
liquid securities or markets - a classic case of looking for lost keys under the lamp post, where the
light is shining, rather than where they were lost. Consequently, any results from such studies are
skewed in the direction of the most liquid segment of these markets, and may not necessarily apply
to the market as a whole. Clearly, what is needed, therefore, is a measure of liquidity that does not
rely on transactions data; such a measure would be ideal for studying liquidity in markets where
the issue is of greatest interest: those that are relatively illiquid.
In order to address the question of liquidity in relatively illiquid markets, we construct a new
liquidity measure that estimates the accessibility of a security, rather than its trading characteristics,
and apply this measure to the US corporate bond market. Our measure is simply the weighted
average turnover of investors who hold a particular bond, where the weights are the fractional
holdings of the amount outstanding of the bond.3 Since corporate bonds trade in a dealer network,
dealers rely on being able to access their “buy-side” clients’ holdings either to purchase or sell
bonds. If a bond is readily accessible, meaning a dealer can contact one of a number of “buy-side”
clients and obtain the bond easily, the bond can be thought of as potentially liquid, even though it
may not actually trade very much. Specifically, we conjecture that if a bond issue is held primarily
by investors with high portfolio turnover, (e.g. a hedge fund) the bond may be thought of as more
accessible - essentially, it is easier for a dealer to contact one of the investors holding this bond and
convince them to sell it at a reasonable spread in relation to its fundamental value. On the other
hand, if a bond issue is held primarily by investors with low portfolio turnover, such as long term
buy-and-hold investors (e.g. insurance companies), it is more difficult for dealers to convince them
to sell it, and hence, the bond is less accessible.
The theoretical underpinning for our proposed measure of liquidity is the insight offered by
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) that in equilibrium, securities with higher transaction costs and
poorer liquidity are held by investors with longer trading horizons, because they are able to amor-
3We use the corporate bond market as an important example of an illiquid market, but it should be clear that the
liquidity concepts and measures discussed here apply, more generally, to any security traded in an illiquid market.
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tize their transaction costs over longer periods of time. In contrast to the exogenous treatment
of transaction costs in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen(2003) en-
dogenize transaction costs by presenting a search-based model of over-the-counter markets. They
demonstrate that bid-ask spreads charged by market makers are likely to be higher when agents
have lower trading frequencies, and hence fewer options to search. Vayanos and Wang (2005)
present another search-based model to demonstrate that liquidity may get concentrated in some
assets endogenously in equilibrium, leading to lower search times and lower transaction costs. These
theoretical models may be seen as justifications for our measure of latent liquidity, which has the
additional practical advantage that it does not require transactions data.
We investigate the drivers of this measure in the US corporate bond market.4 We analyze
various characteristics of a bond, such as its credit rating and maturity, to determine whether
or not each characteristic contributes to higher or lower liquidity, or accessibility, for that bond.
Since the corporate bond market is essentially an over-the-counter market, with a large number
of dealers, obtaining data on this market is more difficult than for exchange-traded markets with
a single locus of transactions. No single dealer has enough market share, and, therefore, handles
enough transactions for a meaningful analysis to be conducted. For this reason, our data-set comes
from the world’s largest custody bank, which holds data from a large number of “buy-side” clients.
As part of their custody process, these banks record the transactions conducted by their clients;
thus, the largest custody banks essentially “see” across the transactions databases of multiple
dealers. While not being able to access data on all the transactions in the corporate bond market,
the largest custodians do record a substantial proportion of it. More importantly, the custodians
become aware of only institutional, rather than inter-dealer, trading; thus, the database we use
constitutes a more relevant portion of the trading universe (for the purpose of studying liquidity
effects). As a result, the findings of the paper are much more appropriate for institutional trading
and bond holdings.
In recent years, starting in mid-2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
4Prior to the availability of transactions databases such as the NAIC or FIPS, studies typically employed yield
spreads or issue size as proxies for liquidity. See, for example, Sarig and Warga (1989), Blume, Keim, and Patel
(1991), and Crabbe and Turner (1995).
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has initiated a program known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), in which
the individual members of the NASD report all their corporate bond transactions to a central
agency. These transactions are aggregated into a common, market-wide database. However, the
TRACE effort was not comprehensive in its initial years, although, as we find, it is becoming more
so, with time. Furthermore, because the program is relatively new, a reasonably long history will
not be available for many years. More importantly, as we shall see later, our measure of liquidity
also requires information regarding the holdings of bonds by different investors. This is, clearly,
not available in the TRACE database, which only records transactions volume and prices. In the
context of this paper, however, we use transaction costs and price impacts estimated from TRACE
data to validate our measure of latent liquidity.
In our empirical study, we find that credit quality, age, issue size, the original maturity value
at issue date, and optionalities such as call, put, or convertibility, all have a strong impact on
our measure of liquidity. In these regressions, we use three different measures of liquidity as a
dependent variable: our latent liquidity measure and two transaction-based measures, which are
all alternative formulations of trading volume and therefore available only for the relatively liquid
segment of our sample. We observe that when we restrict ourselves to bonds in the liquid segment
of our database that have a relatively high trading volume, the results from the regressions are
similar whether we use latent liquidity or the transaction-based measures.
In order to validate our measure in the set of traded bonds, we also estimate transaction costs
in the corporate bond market using a sub-sample of bonds for which trading volume is available in
the TRACE database, using the limited dependent-variable model similar to Lesmond, Chen and
Wei (2005). We demonstrate that latent liquidity has explanatory power for transaction costs, over
and above observable bond characteristics such as coupon, rating, age and issue size, as well as
realized trade count. Including latent liquidity eliminates the explanatory power of age and trade
count for most quarters for which we are able to compute transactions costs. Unconditionally,
there is a 200 basis point difference between the lowest ranked and the highest ranked bonds (by
percentile of latent liquidity), and holding other variables constant, there is around a 105 basis point
difference. As further validation that latent liquidity conveys incremental information, we compute
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the price impact of trading corporate bonds using the TRACE database, using the Amihud (2002)
measure. We find that latent liquidity explains price impact both unconditionally, and over and
above issue size, age, coupon, rating, and realized trade count. We find that, unconditionally, an
increase in the latent liquidity percentile from 0 to 100% leads to an eight-fold decrease in the price
impact, while conditionally, it leads to around a two-fold decrease in the price impact.
These results gives us some comfort that the latent liquidity statistic is a good proxy for
liquidity. We receive additional confirmation for the validity of our measure from the results of
similar empirical tests on the entire database (including the bonds that do not trade often enough for
transaction-based liquidity measures to be calculated), where we find essentially the same results.
From our empirical work, we conclude the following: when there is frequent trading and transactions
data are available, our latent liquidity measure is as good, or better than transaction-based liquidity
measures. When there is infrequent trading and transaction-based measures simply cannot be
calculated, our latent liquidity measure still provides a proxy for the liquidity of a security.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the database we use and provides
some indications of how representative it is of the market as a whole, in terms of both holdings
and transactions. It also provides some statistics on the trading frequency of bonds in our sample.
This section also discusses the composition of the database in terms of various bond characteristics,
such as issue size, age, maturity, industry segment etc. Finally, the section concludes with a precise
definition of latent liquidity, along with some graphs of the relationship between the proposed
measure and key bond characteristics. In section 3, we present the results of a series of tests to
check whether latent liquidity provides a good measure of liquidity. We present the results for the
relationship between latent liquidity and the bond characteristics for both the liquid and the less
liquid segment of our sample to provide a sense of how different these are are from the more liquid
segment. We also relate the characteristics of bonds to both latent liquidity and two transaction-
based measures of liquidity, for the most liquid segment of the market, where the latter measures
can be constructed. Section 4 defines a measure of transaction costs using corporate bond trades
reported on the TRACE system, and shows that even in the most actively traded bonds, latent
liquidity has a greater explanatory power on transaction costs than either bond characteristics, or
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realized measures of liquidity. Section 5 shows that even for the most actively traded bonds, latent
liquidity has a incremental explanatory power for price impact over and above bond characteristics
or realized measures of liquidity. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the
proposed measure of liquidity for future research.
2 Liquidity Measurement and Data
While the corporate bond market appears to be an ideal market to study liquidity, particularly the
drivers of liquidity, two primary reasons explain the lack of rigorous empirical research on liquidity
in the US corporate bond market. First, the corporate bond market is a dealer market (essentially
an over-the counter (OTC) market); hence, until recently, no central data source exists for all the
transactions occurring in the market. This has been remedied partially by the establishment of
the TRACE effort in mid-2002. Second, even after the establishment of the TRACE database, in
the absence of transactions data for all but the most liquid bonds, we need an alternative metric
of liquidity, such as latent liquidity, that does not rely on such data. (It should be noted that the
TRACE database does not have information about the holdings or trading behavior of individual
investors, which are required inputs for the computation of latent liquidity.)
2.1 The US Corporate Bond Database
Since no single comprehensive source of trading data exists for the US corporate bond market as
a whole, for a long enough period, one has to rely on data from a sub-set of the market. One
could approach an individual dealer and collect and analyze the transactions in which that dealer
participates. However, this approach leaves open the possibility of biases: for example, a particular
dealer may be a market leader in the high-yield segment of the market, in which case the database
the researcher puts together from that dealer’s transactions will be biased towards high-yield bonds.
In order to mitigate this problem, we use the databases of the world’s largest securities custodian,
State Street Corporation (SSC). The primary functions of a custodian are to provide trade clearance
and settlement, the safekeeping of securities, and asset servicing such as dividend collection, proxy
voting, and accounting and tax services. A custodian is not tied to any one dealer: its customers
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are the owners of assets, not the broker/dealers. Asset owners typically use multiple dealers to
execute their transactions, but typically use one custodian for all their holdings. Since a custodian
is not associated with any single dealer, its data aggregates transactions across multiple dealers.
Therefore, the transactions database of a custodian, particularly the largest one, should be much
more comprehensive than that of any one individual dealer; thus, the database is likely to be much
more representative of the aggregate market, particularly relating to institutional investors. More
importantly, unlike even the most comprehensive market database such as TRACE, a custodian’s
database contains information about both transaction prices and the holdings and turnover of
various investors, which will be used in combination in constructing our liquidity measure.
2.2 A Comparative Analysis of the US Corporate Bond Database
The SSC holdings database represents a comparatively large sample of the whole market for US
corporate bonds, in terms of both holdings as well as transactions. It also covers a relatively long
history from January 1994 to June 2006.5 We first present some evidence of the representative
nature of the database in relation to the universe of US corporate bonds.
Table 1A presents the composition of our bond database broken down by industry, as compared
to the total universe of US corporate bonds. The universe is defined based on data from Reuters,
for the amount of bonds outstanding, in various industry segments as of June 30, 2006. As can
be seen from the table, which presents the amounts outstanding in the various industry categories,
our total sample represents about 14.52% of the whole market.6 We can see from this table that
our database provides a good representation of the cross-section of bonds outstanding. The only
significant deviation occurs with banks and the telephone industry. Banks are over-represented in
our database (19.87% vs 13.96% of the total universe). In contrast, our database is underweight in
telephone (4.98% vs 8.27% of the total universe).
Table 1B presents a similar disaggregation of our data in relation to the universe of US corpo-
rate bonds, based on Moody’s credit rating. Our database’s credit quality composition exhibits a
5Unfortunately, some of the bond characteristics were not available in our database for the entire sample period.
Consequently, we have restricted our empirical analysis to the period from January 2000 to June 2005.
6We use the industry categories defined by Reuters.
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somewhat greater deviation from the universe, as compared to the industry composition in Table
1A. However, our database still remains reasonably representative of the universe, with our data
being over-represented in the high quality (Aaa and Aa) segment (12.20% and 25.72%, in the SSC
sample, respectively, compared with 7.49% and 18.61% in the universe) and under-represented in
the low quality (C and ungraded) segment (0.21% and 7.32%, respectively, compared with 0.66%
and 9.53% in the universe). This is not surprising, considering that our holdings database consists
of portfolios of institutional investors.
Table 1C presents the disaggregated statistics for our database in relation to the universe, based
on maturity. Again, our database remains reasonably representative of the universe, although it
is somewhat under-represented for the long maturity segment (greater than 10 years) - around
17.89% of the SSC sample, compared to 24.69% in the universe - and over-represented for very
short maturities (less than 1 year) - 22.23% in the SSC sample, as opposed to 12.32% in the whole
market.
We turn next to the transaction statistics for our database versus the whole market, based on
data from the Bond Market Association (BMA).7 This is presented in Table 2. We cannot draw
conclusions about the representativeness of the trades in our database for the various cross-sections,
due to the lack of comparable benchmarks for corporate bond transactions in the total universe.
However, we do see that the database comprises of over 6% of the average daily trading volume
in US corporate bonds.8 Furthermore, this level does not fluctuate very much through time. The
stability of trading volume gives some indication that the cross-sectional patterns, presented in
Tables 1A, 1B and 1C, are fairly stable.
Based on the above comparisons, we can conclude that our database is reasonably represen-
tative of the whole market for US corporate bonds. This conclusion holds in terms of the broad
characteristics of the bond market, both for the cross-sectional holdings of the bonds and the way
this cross-section moves through time. We conjecture, therefore, that the conclusions we draw from
7This database does not provide transactions statistics disaggregated into the various categories mentioned earlier.
Further, the statistics are available only on a monthly basis, and that too, only since January 2003.
8We believe that this figure may be on the conservative side, since we generally notice only one side of a trade,
in our database, as opposed to both sides in the market, at large, had such data been available. Also we restrict
ourselves to the sample set of bonds, for which clean security level information and rating data is available, which is
a subset of our data.
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this database should have relevance for the market as a whole.
2.3 Characteristics of the US Corporate Bond Database
Our goal in this paper is to conduct a broad analysis of the illiquidity in the US corporate bond
market, based on the transactions in our database. Table 3 provides data on the illiquidity of the
corporate bond market based on the frequency of trading to support our claim that this market is
highly illiquid. We see from this table that, across the years, there are very few bonds that trade
every day in our sample. The number of bonds that trade approximately every day (defined as
over 200 days in the year) varies between 0 and 6; this is out of a sample of roughly 19,000 bonds.
Even considering a level of trading of at least once a year as relatively liquid, the percentage of the
total number of bonds in our sample that would be defined as liquid is between 22% and 34%, each
year. A large proportion of the bonds - over 40% - do not even trade once a year. These statistics
throw some light on the problem of illiquidity in the corporate bond market and suggest that it
would be futile to look for liquidity measures based only on market micro-structure data.
We now go into greater detail regarding the characteristics of the corporate bonds that are
traded, based on our data set, over the period 2000-2005. We give an indication in Table 4 about
the trading characteristics of corporate bonds that trade in the marketplace. In general, we see
that bond issues are split into one of eleven broad industry categories that we define (these are
in line with the categories used by Reuters). The percentages in the various industry categories
were fairly stable over the course of the 2000-2005 period. Bonds in the financial services industry
(the banks and the other financial categories) traded the most during the sample period. This is
not surprising as financial services industry is the biggest issuer of corporate debt - in 2006, more
than one-third of all new debt issues came from firms within this industry. Most financial services
firms such as banks and insurance companies are highly leveraged entities, with substantial debt
obligations on the right-hand sides of their balance sheets.
Table 5 shows how the trading characteristics of bonds by credit has been changing through
time. During the early part of the sample period (2000-2005), a higher percentage of investment
grade bonds was traded. For example, in 2000, 76% of bond issues traded were rated as investment
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grade(with the rest being in the speculative category). As we progress through time, however, this
proportion decreased to 66% in 2005. Significant changes occurred in the marketplace, during the
sample period. Equity markets dropped substantially during the early 2000s, indicating that the
probability of default of most firms increased, as well. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that credit spreads also increased significantly during this time period. Therefore, if rating agencies
were doing a reasonably good job, the conclusion that more bonds in the marketplace were getting
rated below investment grade, is natural.
We next present the trade data analyzed in terms of various bond characteristics such as
maturity, time since issuance, face value and frequency of trading. We do this for each year, for
data below each cumulative decile, during our sample period, 2000-2005. Table 6 displays the
maturity structure of corporate debt traded in the marketplace. The average maturity of debt has
not fluctuated much during the sample period. Table 7 shows that the time since issuance of traded
debt has been fairly steady from 2000 until 2005.
Table 8 shows the distribution of the outstanding face amount of all debt traded in the market.
The table shows that the median face value amount of trades has increased substantially over the
last five years. For the median bond, the face amount outstanding increased from $ 175 million in
2000 to $ 250 million in 2005. For the top decile, the corresponding numbers were $ 500 million in
2000 going up to $ 800 million in 2005; for the bottom decile, the face amount outstanding went
up from $ 25 million in 2000 to $ 100 million in 2005.
Table 9 gives us a sense of the amount of trading activity that occurs in the US corporate
bond markets. Table 9, which is a variation of Table 3, shows the average number of days that pass
between trades for a bond issue, for those bonds that are actually traded. As shown in Table 3,
most bonds did not have any trades for many years. We exclude them from the analysis presented
in Table 9. For the median traded bond, the average time between trades varied between 12 days
and 18 days within the sample period.9 For the median stock, in comparison, this value is more of
the order of minutes. For the most liquid stocks, this statistic could even be of the order of seconds.
Therefore, we see from Tables 8 and 9 that the corporate bond market is orders of magnitude more
9There are roughly twenty two trading days in a calendar month.
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illiquid than the stock market, even if we were to consider the liquid segment of corporate bond
market (as represented by the traded set).
2.4 Liquidity Measurement
The previous section provided strong evidence in support of the conclusion that the U.S. corporate
bond market is extremely illiquid. Therefore, in many ways, this market seems a much more relevant
setting to study the problems of illiquidity and its consequences, compared to equity markets, since
illiquidity is a significant issue in the corporate debt market. However, one important problem
remains. Most corporate bonds rarely trade. This makes it difficult to distinguish between whether
a given bond is more liquid than another, particularly if both bonds do not trade for several days
or even months. For example, if one bond trades six times a year and a second one trades three
times a year, the amount of trading in both cases is too small to conclude that the first bond is
twice as liquid as the second. Our proposed measure gives a better sense of the relative liquidity
of the two bonds.
In a dealer, or OTC, market what really determines the liquidity of a security is the ease with
which a dealer can access a security. For example, if a buy order comes in to a dealer, she could
supply that order out of her own inventory, or she could try to source the bonds from the inventory
of one of her other customers. In other words, the dealer could “work the order” by contacting
customers to see if she can convince someone to sell her the bonds to fill the buy order.10 Consider
the case when she is trying to call customers to fill the buy order. If the bond issue of interest
is held primarily by funds with high turnover (hedge funds, for example), it should be easier for
the dealer to contact one of them and to convince them to sell her the needed bonds, than if the
bonds were held primarily by funds with low turnover (insurance companies, for example).11 This
is because the high turnover funds are used to trading in and out of securities with high frequency,
at least, relative to many fixed income investors, who tend to be “buy and hold till maturity”type
of investors. Thus, they could be more easily convinced to trade a particular security they are
10The dealer will, of course, try to buy the bonds at a lower price from the customer than the price at which she
will fill the buy order. Thus, she earns a fee for her “search services.”
11Of course, one can define a whole continuum of customers, in terms of their propensity to trade, rather than the
two referred to in the example.
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holding. Therefore, whether a bond issue experiences a great deal of trading volume or not, we
can say that a bond issue is more liquid in our sense, if it is more accessible by dealers. We define
such access in terms of the turnover of the investors holding the bond issue. In the context of the
accessibility of a security, the search costs and times are likely to be lower for bonds that are held
primarily by high turnover agents.
This measure of accessibility of a security is not a direct measure of liquidity, but rather a
more latent measure. In order to measure latent liquidity, we need to be able to determine, for
each bond issue, which of the many types of investors actually holds the issue and the aggregated
weighted average turnover of all the investors holding the issue. If the weighted average turnover
of all the funds holding a particular bond issue is high, then we say that the bond issue has high
latent liquidity. In other words, it is more accessible, relative to another bond that has lower latent
liquidity. Latent liquidity, in that sense, can be thought of as the degree to which it is held by
investors who are expected to trade more frequently, based on historical trading patterns.
Once again, a custodian is in an ideal position to obtain the information needed to calculate
latent liquidity. Custodians are aware not only about the transactions level information, but also
the individual portfolio holdings. Therefore, if we look at the historical custodial holdings database,
we can calculate a twelve-month historical turnover number for all portfolios. For any particular
bond issue, we aggregate across all the investors holding that issue, to calculate a weighted average
turnover measure. This statistic becomes our latent liquidity measure for that particular bond.
More formally, we define the fractional holding of bond i (as a percentage of the total out-
standing amount of the bond issue in our database) by fund j at the end of month t as piij,t. Also,
we define the average portfolio turnover of fund j from month t to month t− 12 as Tj,t, where the
portfolio turnover is defined as the ratio of the value of fund j at the end of month t to the dollar
trading volume of fund j from month t to month t− 12. Latent liquidity for bond i in month t is
defined as
Lit =
∑
j
piij,tTj,t
Therefore, we define latent liquidity for any bond i, at any time t, as the aggregate weighted-average
level of turnover of the individual funds holding bond i.
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The most convenient feature of this measure is that it is based entirely on aggregate investors’
holdings and does not require individual transaction details. In fact, as we have already said, the
lack of sufficient corporate bond transaction data is at the heart of illiquidity in bond markets.
Therefore, this measure can be calculated even in the absence of trading in a particular bond,
and hence, especially convenient in the case of illiquid markets. Furthermore, this measure can
be calculated quite accurately, on a monthly basis, for every public bond issue, given the unique
nature of our database, which consists of data on both transactions, as well as holdings of a large
set of investors in the market. It should be noted that even if a larger set of trading data eventually
became available from the TRACE database, the metric we propose would require, in addition,
information regarding the holdings and turnover of individual investors in the market, which is
usually proprietary.
Figures 1 through 5 present the patterns of changes in latent liquidity with respect to changes
in certain bond characteristics, to show how they accord with more casually stated stylized facts.
To generate these figures, after calculating a latent liquidity number for each US corporate bond
in our database, we ranked bonds into percentiles (scaled 0-1, in our empirical work and presented
in the graphs and tables), based on their latent liquidity, where 0 represents the lowest liquidity
level and 1 the highest liquidity level. For each bond characteristic, the latent liquidity percentile
rank is averaged across bonds with a particular value of the characteristic. The graphs represent
the relationship between the (average) latent liquidity and the particular bond characteristic.
Figure 1 plots the (average) latent liquidity of bonds in relation to their age, from the time
they were first issued, until maturity. We observe that bonds are at their peak latent liquidity
levels when they are just issued. Their latent liquidity level decreases steadily after issuance, until
final maturity. This is consistent with, but more specific than, the casual evidence that “on-the-
run” bonds are more liquid than their “off-the-run” counterparts. The conjecture that emerges is
that many bonds are initially placed into high turnover funds, who then “flip” the bonds to lower
turnover (usually, buy-and-hold) funds. We see that latent liquidity values are greater than 0.5, on
average, for bonds with an age of less than one year, and, in general, decrease over time to a value
of less than 0.3, for bonds with an age greater than 26 years.
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Figure 2 shows the relationship between (average) latent liquidity and issue size. Generally
speaking, there is a positive correlation between issue size and liquidity. The biggest improvement
in liquidity occurs for issue sizes below $ 600 million. The liquidity is relatively flat again, until a
size of $3 billion is reached, when it increases once again. This could possibly have to do with the
inclusion of bonds of size greater than $3 billion into indices such as the Lehman Aggregate Index.
Figure 3 provides a plot of the (average) latent liquidity versus time to maturity for bond issues.
We observe that the longer the maturity of a bond, the higher its latent liquidity, although there
are clear jumps in the pattern, at certain maturity levels. The jumps in this figure are initially
surprising, but easily explained - they are due to bond issues of “standard” maturities. For instance,
bonds with a 10-year maturity are of two types: bonds that were issued in the past and are now
down to 10 years to maturity i.e., “off-the-run” bonds and bonds that have just been issued i.e.,
“on-the-run” bonds. However, bonds with a 11-year maturity are likely to be mostly “off-the-run”
bonds (because 11 years is seldom chosen as a maturity time for newly-issued bonds). Therefore,
the significantly higher latent liquidity of the “on-the-run” bonds at the 10-year maturity level
results in a substantially higher latent liquidity measure at the 10-year level vs. the 11-year level;
hence, the observed jump in the graph. The same result holds at typical maturity points for new
issues, such as at 20, and 30 years.
Figure 4 presents the (average) latent liquidity as a function of coupon rates over the sample
period. There is no clear pattern in this relationship, because coupon effects are confounded by
credit rating, age, maturity and issue date, since there are strong correlations between the coupon
rate and these bond characteristics. In a loose sense, it appears that issues with a higher coupon
rate enjoy greater liquidity than those with a lower coupon. However, it appears that zero coupon
bonds are more liquid than bonds with a promised coupon rate of up to approximately 10 %. This
may be due to the desirability of zero coupon issues for implementing hedging and cash matching
strategies.
Figure 5 represents the (average) latent liquidity as a function of Moody’s credit rating. We
observe that latent liquidity steadily improves as we move down in credit quality. However, since
the relationship is inherently multi-factor in nature, with independent variables that are, to some
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extent, correlated with each other, we need to examine it further through regression analysis. We
turn to this empirical analysis in the next section.
3 The drivers of bond liquidity
In this section, we try to discern which features of a bond lead to better liquidity. To investigate
this question, we conduct a series of regressions where the dependent variable is a particular metric
of liquidity for a bond in the database at a point in time, while the independent variables are a set
of the bond’s characteristics. In order to perform these regressions, we compute the latent liquidity
of each bond as of the beginning of a quarter. Since latent liquidity does not require transactions
in the bond, we are able to conduct regressions where latent liquidity is the dependent variable
on all the bonds in our database. In order to better understand differences between traded and
non-traded bonds, we also run these regressions separately on bonds that have traded at least once
in a quarter, and on bonds that have not traded at all. From our earlier tables, this means that we
restrict ourselves to slightly less than half the database.
In the analysis below, we use two trade-based liquidity measures for a bond. The first is
trade count: the number of trades that occur in a particular quarter. The second is trade volume:
the average market value of trades for the bond each quarter.12 The purpose of using the more
conventional measures of liquidity is to compare the empirical results we obtain for latent liquidity
with those for more conventional measures. For trading volume and the trade count, we are, for
obvious reasons, restricted to using only bonds that have traded at least once a quarter.
We observe that there are large outliers in the measures. Hence, for all the liquidity measures
we consider (including latent liquidity), we convert the liquidity measures into a percentile rank
within each quarter. Each bond is ranked on a scale of 0 to 1 (from less liquid to more liquid)
within a quarter. Thus, we interpret these measures to be cardinal rather than ordinal measures of
liquidity. This cardinal measure has the additional advantage of making the measures comparable
from one quarter to another regardless of changes in overall trading volumes in the market, or
12We have also run these regressions using the number of days on which a bond trades as a measure of liquidity.
However, there is a very high correlation between trade count and the number of days traded, and the results are
very similar to those we observe for the trade count, and are not reported here.
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changes in coverage.
We first examine the correlations between our measure of latent liquidity and the two trade-
based measures of liquidity, the results of which are presented in Table 10. Only bonds that traded
at least once in a given quarter are included in this sample. The correlations between the two
trade-based measures are fairly high, as is to be expected, since they all measure the frequency and
size of trades. However, the correlations between latent liquidity and the trade-based measures are
more modest. Given the relatively infrequent trading in even the most liquid US corporate bonds,
apparently the trade-based measures do not quite measure the same latent liquidity effects that
are captured in our measure. We next investigate the relationship between the three measures and
various characteristics of the bonds, in separate regressions, the results of which are presented in
Tables 11.
Table 11 presents results from the regressions of these liquidity measures, on independent
variables related to the characteristics of the bonds. These regressions were performed on quarterly
data from January 2000 to July 2006. In these regression, we use latent liquidity, trade count and
trading volume (in percentile ranks from 0 to 1) as the dependent variables, for both the traded and
non-traded sets of bonds. All columns present the coefficients and z -statistics of a random effects
regression, where the observations are clustered by quarters to account for correlations between the
residuals in every quarter.13
As one might expect, liquidity seems to be strongly correlated with the face amount of a bond
outstanding, or the issue size of a bond. The larger the issue size, the more liquid is the bond. A
preview of this result was illustrated in Figure 2, where we saw that when the size of the issue falls
below $1 billion, the smaller an issue size, the less liquid is the issuance. However, Figure 2 also
showed that for amounts above $1 billion, issue size seems to have only a small effect on liquidity.
For smaller issue sizes, liquidity clearly diminishes with size. Smaller-sized issues do not appeal to
a broad class of investors, since it would be difficult and costly to acquire a large position, which
some institutional investors may require. The link between issue size and liquidity has also been
identified as important by other researchers such as Hong and Warga (2000), Alexander, Edwards,
13It is possible that residuals are correlated for each bond across quarters. In order to account for this, we also
perform Fama-Macbeth regressions using the cross-section of bonds in every quarter, as discussed below.
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and Ferri (2000), and Hotchkiss, Warga, and Jostava (2002).
The current age of the bond since issuance has a strong negative correlation with liquidity,
i.e., a bond with a greater age (one that has been outstanding for a longer time) has less liquidity.
This is the well known “on-the-run” vs. “off-the-run” effect (see for instance Sarig and Warga
(1989), Warga (1992), Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), Hong and Warga (2000), Schultz (2001),
and Hotchkiss, Warga, and Jostava (2002)). When a bond is initially issued, it is “on-the-run”
and has much higher liquidity than some time later, after it has been outstanding for a while and
becomes “off-the-run”.
The credit quality of a bond appears to be inversely correlated to liquidity, i.e. the higher the
probability of default (and therefore the lower the credit rating) the higher the degree of liquidity.
This is a surprising result, because most people tend to associate high credit quality with high
liquidity. The simple explanation here is that bonds that have a high credit quality are usually
held by long-term “buy-and-hold” investors such as insurance companies, which have long-term
liabilities and hold fixed income assets for asset-liability matching reasons, because these bonds are
less likely to default and force a portfolio re-balancing. In addition, low-grade issues have a greater
probability of rating migration, necessitating more frequent re-balancing.
The current maturity of the bond seems to have a negligible effect on the liquidity of the
bonds for all the measures. However, some effects are observed using the original maturity of the
bonds at the time of issue. The “original maturity” variables are all dummy variables indicating
the maturity of the bond when it was issued. From the coefficients here, it appears that bonds
with lower original maturity, such as 5 and 7 years, have greater latent liquidity than those with an
original maturity of 10 years or 30 years. Again, one explanation here is that long term “buy-and-
hold” investors such as insurance companies (which hold a substantial amount of the total bonds
outstanding) have long-dated liabilities, against which they match long-dated assets. Once they
“find” these assets, they tend to hold them. However, when we use the trading volume and trade
count as measures of liquidity, these effects are not as pronounced. It appears that bonds with
non-standard original maturities (other than 5, 7, 10 or 30) are the least traded. We also see that
if a bond’s issuer is classified as being an industrial company, the bond tends to be less liquid, i.e.,
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it tends to be held by low turnover funds. On the other hand, if a bond is from a financial issuer, it
appears to be held by more active funds, although this does not translate into a greater amount of
trading in the bonds. Utilities, however tend to have less liquidity as reflected in all three measures.
Privately-placed bonds tend to have lower liquidity in our sample using the trade-based measures,
however, when traded, they seem to be held by the more active funds, although the significance of
the coefficients is in doubt. This issue needs to be examined more closely in future research.
Issuers generally have the choice of including various provisions into bond indentures. These
provisions include option features that render the bond callable or putable, or making the bond
convertible into equity. In our results, callable bonds tend to have higher trading volume and trade
count. The difference in the coefficients in the latent liquidity regressions between traded and non-
traded callable bonds is intriguing, and shows that while callable bonds that are liquid are generally
held to a greater extent by higher turnover funds, callable bonds that are not liquid are held, to
a greater extent, by lower turnover funds. The “puttability” of a bond makes it more attractive
to higher turnover funds, although they are not highly traded. These results are surprising: one
might think that adding complexity such as optionality to a bond would make it more difficult to
trade, since the complexity may prevent less sophisticated investors from investing in these bonds,
thus limiting the pool of potential investors. The results are also conflicting with respect to the
convertibility feature of bonds. The trade-based measures show a negative relationship between
liquidity and the presence of this feature. In contrast, the latent liquidity regression results show
a positive relationship between convertibility of a bond and its liquidity. Other characteristics of
a bond such as whether the bond pays a fixed or floating coupon payment, or the periodicity of
the coupon payments, do not seem to affect the liquidity of a bond in a systematic manner. The
zero-coupon nature of some bonds seems to make them more attractive to active funds; however,
these are not very highly traded, making it likely that they are primarily held for hedging purposes.
Some general comments about the various findings in this section are in order. First, we note
that the coefficients on the drivers of latent liquidity between traded and non-traded bonds are
consistent both in magnitude and in direction. The only major differences seem to be on how
callability, variable interest rates and private placement affect latent liquidity for traded and non-
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traded bonds. These effects themselves are interesting and warrant further investigation. These
results give us a strong indication that the latent liquidity measure can be extended to the illiquid
segment of the US corporate bond market. The fact that latent liquidity is a consistent measure,
and does not have a sample bias, leads us to believe that it can be used as a measure of liquidity
uniformly across all bonds in the US corporate bond universe. It can be applied not only to the
relatively liquid bonds where trade data are available but also to the illiquid segment of the US
corporate bond universe, for which trade-based measures of liquidity cannot be obtained. Second,
as expected, the drivers of latent liquidity, trading volume and trade count - amount outstanding,
age, rating class and industry sector - seem to be the primary drivers of liquidity. Third, there are
some important differences between the effect of certain bond characteristics, which are secondary
drivers. Fourth, we also find that the power of these regressions is higher for latent liquidity because
of the larger number of observations available for this metric, since it can be computed even when
no transaction occurs in the subsequent period.
In order to check that our results are robust for possible within-bond and across quarter auto-
correlation in residuals, we perform quarterly cross-sectional regressions, and then aggregate the
coefficients across quarters, according to the Fama-Macbeth method. The results of these are
presented in Table 12. The coefficients are very similar to those we obtain under our random
effects specification, indicating that our results are robust to either specification. Table 13 presents
a summary of the sign and the significance of each of these coefficients when performed on the
cross-section of bonds available for each quarter.
4 Latent Liquidity and transaction costs
We demonstrate an application of the concept of latent liquidity in the prediction of transaction
costs in the bond market, and in doing so, present a validation of our measure. The recent liter-
ature on transaction costs contains many models for estimating transactions costs. Bessembinder,
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2005) use data reported by insurance companies to the National As-
sociation of Insurance Companies in order to estimate round-trip transactions costs for a limited
set of bonds using a signed-variable approach. Using the same data-set, Goldstein, Hotchkiss and
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Sirri (2005) establish that transaction costs have decreased after the introduction of reporting on
TRACE. However, both these methodologies require the use of signed trades, and are limited in
scope to the trades reported by insurance companies.
Unfortunately, TRACE data as made available by the NASD, does not have buy/sell identifiers
for trades, although it covers a much broader segment of the market, both in terms of the cross
section of instruments traded, and number of market participants. Hence, for the purpose of
estimating transaction costs in bonds, we use the limited dependent variable approach of Chen,
Lesmond and Wei (2005). This method allows us to form estimates of transaction costs only on
the basis of the last traded prices for every day in the TRACE database. A detailed explanation of
the method is given in appendix A. The estimated transaction costs are in percentages normalized
by the price of the bond. Our estimates of transaction costs are comparable in magnitude to those
obtained by Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2005), both across rating and maturity classes. The only
point of departure from their method is in our use of transactions reported on TRACE for the
computation of return series in bonds, as opposed to their approach of using Datastream daily
prices, which represents quotes from a much smaller set of contributors.14
Univariate regressions of the transaction cost estimates on latent liquidity for each quarter are
presented in Table 14. The coefficient on latent liquidity is consistently negative for all quarters. In
an overall sense, going from a percentile rank of 0 to 100% (0-1 in our scale) leads to a reduction in
estimated transaction costs of around 200 basis points. However, if latent liquidity is indeed a better
measure of liquidity than realized measures such as trade count or trade volume, we would expect
latent liquidity at the beginning of a quarter to have explanatory power over and above the realized
trading count during the quarter, and bond-specific variables that primarily drive liquidity such as
outstanding amount, coupon, rating and age. We test this relationship on quarterly estimates of
transaction costs in our bonds for the period from July, 2002 (when substantial reporting on TRACE
begins) to June, 2006. These results are reported in Table 15. The estimation of transaction costs
14We also attempted an alternate specification using changes in interest rates and the changes in the credit default
swap (CDS) premium, obtained from a leading broker in the CDS market, for the issuer of a bond as a measure of
its “true” return. However, the CDS market itself is liquid for only a fraction of all the bonds traded in the market
and often has fewer observed returns than the bond itself. Thus, such an analysis severely restricts the number of
bonds for which we can estimate transaction costs. It is possible to pursue this issue further as the liquidity of the
CDS market improves.
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requires us to have bonds with a minimum of five trade observations in any given quarter. This
requirement, along with the fact that we are considering an intersection of trades reported on
TRACE with the SSC database restricts the number of bonds in our sample for every quarter to
the numbers that are reported in Table 15. It is clear that with the passage of time, trading activity
as reported on the TRACE database has increased, as evidenced by the increasing number of bonds
available in our sample.
Even after controlling for other variables, the coefficient on the latent liquidity percentile is
consistently negative for all the quarters in our sample period, and is significant for nine out of the
sixteen quarters in our data-set. On an average, after controlling for realized liquidity in the form
of trade count and bond characteristics that primarily drive liquidity in bonds, we still find that
there is a 105 basis point difference in transaction costs between the most liquid and the least liquid
bonds in our sample. We also find that amount outstanding has significant explanatory power for
transaction costs. An increase of an order of magnitude in the issue size leads to a reduction of
about 91 basis points in the transaction costs. The coefficient on the amount outstanding is also
strongly negative, and so is the coefficient on the trade count variable. However, once we control
for latent liquidity, age and transaction volume appear to lose most of their explanatory power.
Thus, the explanatory power of latent liquidity is clearly over and above both measures of realized
liquidity, as well as bond-specific variables.
This result is important because it shows that it is not only bond characteristics and the
realized liquidity of a bond that drives its transaction costs, but also its accessibility, as measured
by latent liquidity. It is also significant in these regressions that latent liquidity has a true predictive
relationship, since we use beginning of the quarter latent liquidity to predict transaction costs within
the quarter, over and above the trade count during the quarter. Furthermore, the consistency of
the coefficients across quarters gives us confidence that our results are robust across time. These
results give us confidence that latent liquidity is indeed a meaningful and viable measure of liquidity
that can be applied to both traded and non-traded bonds.
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5 Latent liquidity and price impact
Another way through which illiquidity manifests itself is in the price impact of trading a security.
Several microstructure-based measures of price impact have been documented in the literature, of
which the measure proposed by Amihud (2002), based on the λ measure of Kyle (1985), is the most
intuitive and simple to implement. We use the Amihud measure of price impact, which is simply
the average ratio of the absolute return in a bond to its trading volume in any given period. If the
absolute return during a day t is |rt| and the trading volume on that day is Vt, the average Amihud
measure over a period of T days is given by
ILLIQT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|rt|
Vt
.
A higher value of the measure implies a greater price impact of trading, and consequently,
lower liquidity. Price impact is also positively correlated with transaction costs.15 It is useful to
assess the predictive power of the other liquidity variables in assessing price impact as a check
on the results of the previous section. However, this measure of liquidity in the bond markets
presents a few implementation challenges; we need to make some decisions on how we treat the
data, which need to be made explicit. We use transactions reported on TRACE in order to compute
the ILLIQ measure for every bond for every quarter, provided we observe at least five market lot
trades (defined as a minimum of USD 1 million of face value of the bond traded) in the bond in that
quarter. The return on the bond is computed using the last traded “clean” prices of market lots on
a given day only, and thus ignores the accrued coupon. This screen avoids using price observations
from small trades that may not be reflective of the true return. In addition transactions greater
than 5 million on TRACE are reported as 5MM+, and transactions greater than 1 million are
occasionally reported as 1MM+. We assume these to be 5 million and 1 million respectively. The
ratio of daily absolute returns to the daily trading volume is averaged over a quarter for every bond.
Days on which there are no trades represent a zero return and a zero trading volume, and are thus
15The reader is encouraged to refer to Amihud (2002) for a detailed discussion of the measure.
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not included in the averaging. For the set of bonds for which we have computed transaction cost,
this gives us a quarterly measure of price impact of trading. Because there tend to be large positive
outliers in the measure, we use the log of the measure in our regressions.
Univariate regressions of the log of the Amihud price impact measure on latent liquidity for
each quarter are presented in Table 14. The coefficient on latent liquidity is consistently negative
for all quarters. In the overall sense, going from a percentile rank of 0 to 100% leads to an eight-fold
reduction in the price impact.
We perform quarterly regressions of the Amihud measure on bond characteristics such as
coupon, rating, issue size and age, and on the average trade count during the quarter, and on
the latent liquidity of the bond during the quarter. Table 17 presents these results. We find that
the latent liquidity measure has explanatory power, over and above the other measures, including
the realized trade volume measure. The coefficients have similar signs to those that we observe
in the case of transaction costs. A larger issue size is associated with lower price impact. Age
is positively and significantly associated with price impact. Crucially, longer dated bonds tend
to have a higher price impact of trading than shorter dated bonds. The realized trade volume
is negatively and significantly associated with the trading volume. However, we find that latent
liquidity has additional explanatory power, over and above the transaction-based measures. On an
average going from the lowest latent liquidity to the highest latent liquidity bond (percentile rank
0 to 1), we find that other things remaining the same, the ILLIQ measure is almost halved.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper presents a new measure of liquidity called latent liquidity, and then applies
this measure to a unique corporate bond database to analyze the characteristics of bonds that lead
to higher liquidity. Unlike conventional measures of liquidity, such as trading volume and bid-ask
spreads, latent liquidity does not use transaction information. Instead, it uses information about the
ownership of securities to discern the accessibility of a security by a securities dealer. Therefore,
latent liquidity has the important advantage of being able to provide a measure of liquidity in
situations of low trading intensity, when transaction data are insufficient to compute traditional
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microstructure-based measures of liquidity, but where liquidity is still an important issue.
We apply the latent liquidity measure to the relatively illiquid corporate bond market in order
to determine the characteristics of corporate bonds that lead to higher or lower liquidity. We find
that credit quality, the age of a bond, the size of a bond issue and the industry sector are the
primary drivers of liquidity. In addition, the original maturity value of a bond at issuance date,
and provisions such as a call, put, or convertible options all have an impact on liquidity. If illiquidity
is priced (i.e., investors charge a liquidity risk premium), then the results of this paper indicate
that the design of a bond can have a strong influence on the cost of the bond to the issuer, and the
choice of which bond to hold (from the same issuer) can have a strong influence on the returns of
an investor.
The directional relationship between liquidity and the bond characteristics is compared across
the various liquidity measures. For the most part, the results for latent liquidity agree with the
three traditional measures based on transaction data. However, in certain cases such as original
maturity of the bond, the face value outstanding and the optionality features of the bonds, latent
liquidity seems to agree with intuitive reasoning, whereas the other measures do not always behave
consistently. We also determine that latent liquidity does not have a sample bias and can be used as
a measure of liquidity uniformly across all the bonds in corporate bond universe. It can be applied
not only to the relatively liquid bonds where trade data is available but also to the illiquid segment
of the corporate bond universe, where transactional data is rare or unavailable and where traditional
measures (based on transactional data) cannot be applied with any statistical confidence.
Latent liquidity has the potential to predict transaction costs of trading in the illiquid corporate
bond market. We demonstrate this by using data on all trades in bonds on a smaller subset in our
sample, we also determine that latent liquidity has greater explanatory power that either transaction
volume or bond specific characteristics on transaction costs in bonds, showing that it is not only
the realized liquidity of the bond that matters for trading costs, but also the turnover of agents
holding a bond, as measured by latent liquidity. Another manifestation of liquidity is in the form of
the price impact of trading. We use the Amihud ILLIQ measure to compute the average quarterly
price impact in bonds that trade actively on TRACE. We find that latent liquidity has explanatory
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power for price impact, both unconditionally, and over and above other bond specific variables.
Hence, latent liquidity has the potential to predict both transaction costs and price impact in the
illiquid corporate bond market.
We believe that this research can also pave the way to explain some portion of the yield
spreads on corporate bonds that cannot be explained by structural models of corporate credit
risk. In future research, we will investigate this directly by incorporating our liquidity factors in
structural models of credit risk. It would also be interesting to examine the significance of liquidity
in determining asset returns. In particular, we propose to use this measure in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in bond yield spreads, over their Treasury and swap rate benchmarks, after
accounting for default risk. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, it is likely that latent
liquidity will explain at least part of the cross-sectional variation in bond yields, apart from the
default premium. Our research will also address the issue of liquidity risk of corporate bonds, and
whether or not, it is systematic in relation to the market-wide liquidity. An additional question
that we will attempt to examine is whether liquidity risk is, in fact, priced, and whether it is an
important element of the total yield spread of corporate bonds over comparable Treasury bonds.
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Appendix A
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2005) use daily observations of bond returns to generate bond-level
liquidity costs. They assume that the return generating process for bonds is driven by two fac-
tors: an interest rate factor and an equity market factor. We provide a brief exposition of their
methodology.16
The true return generating process for any bond is then given by:
R∗j,t = βj,1Durationj,t∆Rf,t +Durationj,tβj,2R
S&P
t + j, t (A-1)
where R∗j,t is the true unobserved return on the bond, ∆Rf,t is the change in the five-year risk-free
interest rate and RS&Pt is the daily return on the S&P index. Accounting for transaction costs, the
realized return on the bond is given by
Rj,t = R∗j,t − α1,j if R∗j,t < α1,j and α1,j < 0
Rj,t = 0 if α1,j < R∗j,t < α2,j
Rj,t = R∗j,t − α2,j if R∗j,t > α2,j and α2,j > 0 (A-2)
where Rj,t is the observed return, α2,j is the effective buy-side cost and α1,j is the effective sell-side
cost. Assuming that daily bond returns are normally distributed gives a log likelihood function for
16For a complete treatment of estimating transaction costs using limited dependent variable models, refer to
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2005).
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the system, that can then be estimated.
LNL =
∑
1
Log
(
1
(2piσ2j )1/2
)
−
∑
1
1
2σ2j
(
Rj + α1,j − βj,1Durationj,t∆Rf,t −Durationj,tβj,2RS&Pt
)2
+
∑
2
Log
(
1
(2piσ2j )1/2
)
−
∑
2
1
2σ2j
(
Rj + α2,j − βj,1Durationj,t∆Rf,t −Durationj,tβj,2RS&Pt
)2
+
∑
0
Log [Φ2,j − Φ1,j ] (A-3)
where
∑
1 represents the negative non-zero observed returns,
∑
2 represents the positive non-zero
observed returns, and
∑
0 represents zero observed returns.
The round trip transaction costs (expressed as a percentage of bond price is then obtained as
α2,j − α1,j . For the purpose of estimating transaction costs in our dataset, we include all bonds
for which we have observations in the TRACE database and for which latent liquidity and other
bond characteristics are available from the SSC database. We match bonds on the basis of their
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number. Returns are observed
whenever a trade takes place in the bond, and are zero otherwise. We reject bonds that have less
than five trades (five measured) returns during a quarter in the TRACE database. We take the
last traded price of a bond on a day as a measure of its end of the day price. We use the constant
maturity five year treasury yield to compute changes in the interest rate factor in equation A-1 and
contemporaneous return on the S&P index as a measure of the equity market return.17 Quarterly
measures of transaction costs so estimated are used in the regressions in Table 15.
17We also attempt an alternate specification using the interest rate and the changes in the credit default swap
premium (obtained from a leading broker in the CDS market) for the issuer of a bond directly as a measure of the
changes in its “true” return. However, the CDS market is liquid for only a fraction of all the bonds traded in the
market and often has fewer observed returns than the bond itself. Thus doing so severely restricts the number of
bonds for which we can estimate transaction costs. Moreover, the magnitude of the transaction costs that we obtained
are comparable to those obtained by Lesmond, Chen and Wei (2005), who use daily corporate bond quotes obtained
from Datastream.
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Figure 1: Latent liquidity rating as a function of bond age: This figure presents the pattern of
changes in the average latent liquidity with respect to age of bond (in years), for trades in US corporate
dollar-denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-
2005. The latent liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the
investors holding the bond. The age of a bond is defined as the number of years since issue. The values of
the latent liquidity rank vary between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest liquidity level and 1 the highest
liquidity level.
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Figure 2: Latent liquidity rating as a function of issue size: This figure presents the pattern of
changes in the average latent liquidity with respect to issue size (in billions of US Dollars), for trades in
US corporate dollar-denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database, during
the period 2000-2005. The latent liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of
turnover of the investors holding the bond. he values of the latent liquidity rank vary between 0 and 1, where
0 represents the lowest liquidity level and 1 the highest liquidity level. Issue size is defined as the amount of
principal at issuance.
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Figure 3: Latent liquidity as a function of maturity: This figure presents the pattern of changes
in the average latent liquidity with respect to time to maturity (in years), for trades in US corporate
dollar-denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-
2005.The latent liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the
investors holding the bond. The age of a bond is defined as the number of years since the issue date. The
values of the latent liquidity rating vary between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest liquidity level and
1 the highest liquidity level.
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Figure 4: Latent liquidity as a function of coupon: This figure presents the pattern of changes in the
average latent liquidity with respect to coupon (in %) for trades in US corporate dollar-denominated bonds,
in the State Street Corporation custody trades database database, during the period 2000-2005. The latent
liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the investors holding the
bond. The coupon is defined as the annual payment in relation to the principal amount of the bond. The
values of the latent liquidity rank vary between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest liquidity level and 1
the highest liquidity level.
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Figure 5: Latent liquidity as a function of Moody’s Ratings Categories: This figure gives the average
value of latent liquidity for various Moodys credit rating categories, in US corporate dollar-denominated
bonds, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005. The latent
liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the investors holding the
bond. The values of the latent liquidity rank vary between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest liquidity
level and 1 the highest liquidity level.
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Table 1-A: Composition of bonds outstanding in the State Street Corporation custody database,
by Industry: This table presents the composition, by industry category, as defined by Reuters, of dollar-
denominated US corporate bonds outstanding, as estimated by them, as of June 30, 2006. This aggregate
amount accounts for about 97% of the total US corporate bonds outstanding of $5,164.9 billion, based on
the data of the Bond Market Association (BMA) at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=2455. The
first column defines the eleven industry categories, and the second and third columns define the amounts
in billions of US dollars, of the total holdings in the markets for the universe of all issues, and for those
issues where State Street Corporation served as custodian. The third and fourth columns show the relative
amounts in percent for the eleven industry categories in the Reuters and State Street databases, respectively.
The last column indicates the relative amount held by State Street, as a fraction of total US dollar amounts
outstanding, in each industry category.
Total State Street Total State Street State Street
Outstanding Holdings Outstanding Holdings Holdings
Industry As % Of As % Of As % Of
Total Total Total OS
Banks $ 701 $ 145 13.96 19.87 20.67
Consumer Goods $ 124 $ 16 2.47 2.24 13.15
Electric Power $ 284 $ 34 5.65 4.73 12.16
Energy Company $ 197 $ 29 3.92 3.92 14.52
Gas Distribution $ 22 $ 2 0.43 0.34 11.25
Independent Finance $ 35 $ 3 0.69 0.45 9.38
Manufacturing $ 563 $ 72 11.21 9.87 12.78
Other Financial $ 1,972 $ 287 39.25 39.30 14.54
Service Company $ 620 $ 92 12.34 12.61 14.84
Telephone $ 415 $ 36 8.27 4.98 8.75
Transportation $ 91 $ 12 1.81 1.71 13.69
Total $ 5,025 $ 730 100 100 14.52
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Table 1-B: Composition of bonds outstanding in the State Street Corporation custody database,
by credit rating:This table presents the composition, by credit rating, as defined by Moodys, of dollar-
denominated US corporate bonds outstanding, as estimated by Reuters, as of May 31, 2006. This aggregate
amount accounts for about 97% of the total US corporate bonds outstanding of $5,164.9 billion, based on
the data of the Bond Market Association (BMA) at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=2455. The
first column defines the nine credit rating categories, and the second and third columns define the amounts
in billions of US dollars, of the total holdings in the markets for the universe of all issues, and for those issues
where State Street Corporation served as custodian. The third and fourth columns show the relative amounts
in percent for the nine credit rating categories in the Reuters and State Street databases, respectively. The
last column indicates the relative amount held by State Street, as a fraction of total US dollar amounts
outstanding, in each credit rating category.
Total State Street Total State Street State Street
Outstanding Holdings Outstanding Holdings Holdings
Rating As % Of As % Of As % Of
Total Total Total OS
Aaa $ 377 $ 89 7.49 12.20 23.65
Aa $ 935 $ 188 20.12 29.30 20.07
A $ 1,161 $ 125 24.97 19.46 10.74
Baa $ 905 $ 119 19.47 18.59 13.16
Ba $ 549 $ 60 11.82 9.42 10.99
B $ 379 $ 73 8.15 11.35 19.20
Caa $ 126 $ 17 2.70 2.70 13.76
Ca $ 81 $ 4 1.75 0.61 4.77
C $ 33 $ 2 0.71 0.24 4.66
Other or NA Grade $ 479 $ 53 10.30 8.34 11.16
Total $ 5,025 $ 730 100 100 14.52
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Table 1-C: Composition of bonds outstanding in the State Street Corporation custody database,
by maturity: This table presents the composition, by maturity, of dollar-denominated US corporate bonds
outstanding, as estimated by Reuters, as of June 30, 2006. This aggregate amount accounts for about 97%
of the total US corporate bonds outstanding of $5,164.9 billion, based on the data of the Bond Market Asso-
ciation (BMA) at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=2455. The first column defines the thirteen
maturity categories, and the second and third columns define the amounts, in billions of dollars of the total
holdings in the markets, for the universe of all issues, and for those issues where State Street Corporation
served as custodian. The third and fourth columns show the relative amounts in percent for the thirteen
maturity categories in the Reuters and State Street databases, respectively. The last column indicates the
relative amount held by State Street, as a fraction of total US dollar amounts outstanding, in each maturity
category.
Total State Street Total State Street State Street
Outstanding Holdings Outstanding Holdings Holdings
Time to As % Of As % Of As % Of
Maturity Total Total Total OS
< 1 Year $ 619 $ 158 12.32 22.23 26.40
2 Years $ 693 $ 95 15.74 16.55 13.65
3 Years $ 433 $ 62 9.84 10.86 14.33
4 Years $ 324 $ 39 7.35 6.86 12.12
5 Years $ 430 $ 58 9.76 10.07 13.40
6 Years $ 310 $ 45 7.04 7.86 14.50
7 Years $ 279 $ 37 6.33 6.48 13.30
8 Years $ 253 $ 40 5.74 6.96 15.74
9 Years $ 211 $ 30 4.79 5.30 14.36
10 Years $ 232 $ 35 5.28 6.06 14.91
Between 11 and 15 Years $ 361 $ 23 8.18 4.02 6.38
Between 16 and 30 Years $ 790 $ 101 17.93 17.72 12.82
> 30 Years $ 90 $ 7 2.05 1.27 8.03
Total $ 5,025 $ 730 100 100 14.52
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Table 2: Comparision of trade volume between State Street Corporation custody compared to
the whole market: This table presents statistics for the monthly traded volume (in billions of US dollars)
of dollar-denominated US Corporate bonds for the entire market versus the amount traded in the State
Street Corporations custody holdings database, during the period January 2004 to December 2005. Only
securities greater than one year to maturity are considered. The aggregate market statistics is provided by
Bond Market Association (BMA) at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=96. The first two columns
indicate the date. The third and fourth columns indicate the average daily par quantity traded in the State
Street database, and in the market, respectively. The last column indicates the ratio of the amount traded
from State Street holdings to that for the entire market (expressed as a percentage).
Trade
Year
Trade
Month
Average Daily
Trade Volume
in State Street
Custody Hold-
ings(in billions
of US Dollars)
Average Daily
Trade Volume
in Market(in
billions of US
Dollars)
Average Daily
Trade Volume
in State Street
Custody Hold-
ings(as a % of
Market)
2004 January 1.53 25 6.12%
2004 February 1.35 22 6.13%
2004 March 1.78 22.7 7.84%
2004 April 1.37 19.8 6.92%
2004 May 1.30 18.4 7.05%
2004 June 1.24 20.1 6.18%
2004 July 1.42 20.6 6.87%
2004 August 1.25 20.6 6.08%
2004 September 1.47 21.1 6.96%
2004 October 1.41 22.3 6.30%
2004 November 1.42 22.7 6.25%
2004 December 1.21 19.4 6.22%
2005 January 1.51 23 6.55%
2005 February 1.37 21.9 6.24%
2005 March 1.58 24.1 6.56%
2005 April 1.32 20.5 6.42%
2005 May 1.33 20.4 6.52%
2005 June 1.39 21.8 6.36%
2005 July 1.16 20.2 5.72%
2005 August 1.15 20.2 5.71%
2005 September 1.21 19.9 6.08%
2005 October 1.13 20.7 5.45%
2005 November 1.16 19.8 5.84%
2005 December 1.06 19.6 5.39%
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Table 3: Trade distribution by the frequency of trading: This table presents statistics for the dis-
tribution of issues by frequency of trade, of US Corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street
Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005. The frequency of trading of an issue is
defined as number of distinct trading days in a given year. The data shows the number of issues correspond-
ing to a particular trading frequency in each year. For example, in 2003, 5 issues traded more than 200 days
and 42 issues traded between 150 and 200 days.
Frequency of Trading 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
> 200 days in year 0 2 5 5 3 6
150-200 days in year 11 16 33 42 25 14
100-150 days in year 38 80 152 146 149 116
50-100 days in year 273 401 621 786 730 739
30-50 days in year 502 675 774 940 1007 961
10-30 days in year 1862 2169 2377 2439 2722 2672
5-10 days in year 1544 1716 1568 1754 1742 1580
At least 1 day and atmost 5 days in year 6191 5866 4987 5006 4786 4335
No trade in year 7872 6979 7163 8262 8397 8693
Total Issues 18293 17904 17680 19380 19561 19116
Table 4: Trade distribution by industry sector: This table presents the distribution of trade market
value, by industry sector, as defined by Reuters, of dollar-denominated US Corporate bonds, in the State
Street Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005. The trading distribution of a
given industry sector is expressed as a percentage of total market value of trades, for the given year, within
the State Street custody database.
Industry Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Banks 10 9 9 8 10 9
Telephone 13 12 9 7 7 7
Manufacturing 15 14 14 17 15 15
Consumer Goods 3 3 4 4 3 2
Electric Power 4 6 5 7 6 6
Energy Company 6 5 6 5 5 5
Transportation 2 2 2 1 2 1
Other Financial 33 32 33 32 34 36
Service Company 15 16 17 19 17 18
Gas Distribution 0 0 0 0 0 0
Independent Finance 0 0 1 1 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 5: Trading distribution by credit rating: This table presents the distribution of trade market
value, by credit rating, as defined by Moodys of dollar-denominated US corporate bonds, in the State Street
Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005. The trading distribution of a given credit
rating is expressed as percentage of total market value of trades, for the given year, within the State Streets
custody trades database.
Credit Rating 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aaa 2 3 4 4 4 3
Aa 12 12 12 11 13 14
A 38 38 30 24 25 21
Baa 23 28 30 29 26 29
Below Baa 24 20 24 33 31 34
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 6: Percentile distribution of trades, by maturity (in years): This table presents the dis-
tribution of maturity, in years, of trades in dollar-denominated US corporate bonds, in the State Street
Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005. The maturity of a bond is defined as
the years remaining to maturity. Bonds that trade in a given year, are sorted in the order of increasing
maturity, and the decile cutoff values are computed. The value shown is the maturity of the bond at the
given percentile. For example, the data shows that the median trade had a time to maturity of 5.6 years in
2000 and 5.9 years in 2005.
Percentile 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
10 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0
20 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0
30 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.1
40 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5
50 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.9 5.9
60 7.0 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.4 7.2
70 8.3 8.2 8.7 9.2 9.1 8.8
80 9.9 10.0 10.6 12.1 11.4 11.0
90 22.7 22.4 22.9 23.2 22.2 21.6
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Table 7: Percentile distribution of trades, by age (in years): This table presents the distribution
of age, in years, of trades in dollar-denominated US denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation
custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005. The age of a bond is defined as the number of years
since its issue. Bonds that trade in a given year, are sorted in the order of increasing age, and the decile
cutoff values are computed. The value shown is the age of the bond at the given percentile. For example,
the data shows that the median trade had an age of 2.5 years in 2000 and 2.3 years in 2005.
Percentile 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
10 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
20 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6
30 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.1
40 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.7
50 2.5 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.3
60 3.1 3.7 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.3
70 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.2 5.1 4.6
80 5.3 5.9 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.8
90 7.5 8.2 8.9 8.4 8.4 8.7
Table 8: Percentile distribution of trades, by face value outstanding (millions of US dollars):
This table presents the distribution of face value (in millions of US Dollars) of trades in corporate-dollar
denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database, during the period 2000-2005.
The face value of a bond is defined as the amount outstanding on the trade date. Bonds that trade in a
given year, are sorted in the order of increasing face amount and the decile cutoff values are computed. The
value shown is the average face value of the bond for the given percentile. For example, the data shows that
the median trade had a face value of 175 million dollars in 2000 and 250 million dollars in 2005.
Percentile 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
10 25 43 64 76 90 100
20 71 100 100 120 125 150
30 100 125 150 150 165 195
40 149 150 195 200 200 220
50 175 200 215 250 250 250
60 200 250 260 300 300 300
70 259 300 315 350 375 400
80 350 400 483 500 500 500
90 500 605 701 750 750 800
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Table 9: Percentile distribution of trades, by time elapsed between successive trades (in days):
This table presents the distribution of time elapsed between trades (in days) of trades in dollar-denominated
US corporate bonds, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database during the period 2000-2005.
The time elapsed is defined as the number of days between successive trades of a given bond. Bonds that
trade in a given year, are sorted in the order of increasing time elapsed and the decile cutoff values are
computed. The values shown are the average time elapsed of the bond for the given percentile range. For
example, the data shows that the median trade had a elapsed time of 14 days in 2000 between successive
trades and 12 days in 2005.
Percentile 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
10 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 3 3 3 2 2 2
30 6 7 6 4 4 4
40 9 13 10 7 8 8
50 14 22 18 13 13 12
60 21 35 31 24 23 21
70 30 56 54 42 40 39
80 44 93 100 82 79 78
90 77 171 206 184 187 188
Table 10: Correlation between various Liquidity Measures: This table presents the correlation be-
tween the various measures of liquidity. The measures of liquidity are latent liquidity, trade days, trade
count and traded market value. Each of the the measures is expressed as a percentile. These variables are
calculated from a set of dollar-denominated US corporate bonds, that traded at least once during a calendar
year, in the State Street Corporation custody trades database. To calculate the latent liquidity percentile,
latent liquidity values are identified as of first trade date of year. These values are arranged in increasing
order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher latent liquidity percentile value indi-
cates higher liquidity. To calculate the number of trade days percentile, we first divide the number of trades
for the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These
normalized values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated.
A higher trade days percentile value indicates higher liquidity. To calculate the trade count percentile (the
dependent variable), we first divide the number of trades for the given issue in the given year, by the amount
outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These normalized values are arranged in increasing order,
for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher trade count percentile value indicates higher
liquidity. To calculate the trade market value percentile, we first divide the total market value of trades for
the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These
normalized values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated.
A higher trade market value percentile value indicates higher liquidity.
Latent liquidity Trade count Trade Days Traded Market value
Latent liquidity 1
Trade count 0.1552 1
Trade Days 0.181 0.9031 1
Traded Market value 0.1356 0.8233 0.7328 1
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Table 11: Random Effects Regressions for the drivers of liquidity: This table shows the result of random effects
regressions using three different measures of liquidity on the sample of dollar-denominated US corporate bonds consisting of
the State Street custody database from January, 2000 to June, 2006. All variables are measured at a quarterly frequency. The
liquidity variables used are the latent liquidity of the bond at the beginning of the quarter, the number of trades in a given
bond in a quarter, and the quarterly volume of trading in terms of market value. The trading volume and trade count measures
used here are based on information available from the database of State Street holdings, since there is no trading information
available on TRACE prior to July, 2002. Ratings are based on the Moody’s classification scheme represented as a cardinal
scale: Aaa-1 Aa-2 A-3 Baa-4 and below Baa - 5. The liquidity variables are represented in terms of percentile values. In order
to compute percentile values, we rank the bonds for each quarter in terms of the liquidity measures and divide by the number
of bonds for which information is available for that measure for that particular quarter. Maturity dummies represent whether
the bond had an original maturity of 5 years, 7 years, 10 years or 30 years. The remaining variables are self-explanatory. The
regressions take the form of random effect regressions with the quarter for which the liquidity is measured as the grouping
variable. This is done so as to account for the fact that residuals within each quarter may be correlated across bonds. We use
clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by quarter.
Latent Liquidity Trade Count Trade Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded Non-Traded All Traded Traded
Log (Amt OS) 0.017 0.011 0.031 0.152 0.180
(11.80)** (8.36)** (25.52)** (39.27)** (52.21)**
Age (Years) -0.013 -0.005 -0.011 -0.014 -0.021
(24.34)** (11.17)** (48.43)** (26.43)** (28.96)**
Rating 0.040 0.030 0.039 0.034 0.078
(11.87)** (17.20)** (26.44)** (13.86)** (45.94)**
Coupon 0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.006
(3.52)** (3.26)** (2.29)* (3.03)** (6.42)**
Maturity (Years) -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.60) (3.69)** (0.16) (2.85)** (1.26)
Maturity 5 (Dummy) 0.055 0.075 0.072 -0.003 0.015
(27.64)** (18.73)** (30.26)** (0.90) (5.44)**
Maturity 7 (Dummy) 0.025 0.051 0.042 -0.017 0.014
(10.39)** (11.24)** (17.30)** (7.58)** (5.87)**
Maturity 10 (Dummy) -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 0.006
(12.56)** (14.35)** (17.83)** (7.87)** (2.34)*
Maturity 30 (Dummy) -0.040 -0.037 -0.049 0.011 0.010
(12.58)** (11.41)** (19.65)** (3.26)** (2.95)**
Financial Sector (Dummy) 0.003 0.016 0.002 -0.032 -0.054
(0.94) (5.79)** (1.12) (8.99)** (19.07)**
Industrial Sector (Dummy) -0.020 -0.012 -0.021 -0.028 -0.038
(6.78)** (3.62)** (7.98)** (10.24)** (17.70)**
Utilities (Dummy) 0.000 -0.002 -0.015 -0.036 -0.064
(0.09) (0.62) (6.03)** (7.32)** (23.15)**
Private Placement (Dummy) 0.037 0.001 0.006 -0.008 -0.050
(15.23)** (0.25) (1.59) (1.99)* (11.46)**
Convertible (Dummy) 0.009 0.096 0.014 -0.156 -0.130
(0.65) (9.14)** (1.03) (15.22)** (9.69)**
Callable (Dummy) 0.031 0.013 0.036 0.020 0.093
(8.28)** (3.34)** (10.55)** (3.06)** (17.12)**
Putable (Dummy) 0.061 0.070 0.052 -0.034 -0.058
(11.67)** (17.32)** (15.37)** (4.02)** (7.50)**
Variable Interest (Dummy) -0.016 0.016 0.004 0.029 -0.015
(4.91)** (1.91) (0.81) (3.93)** (3.34)**
Floating Interest (Dummy) -0.058 0.021 -0.018 0.060 -0.106
(8.28)** (3.35)** (4.80)** (4.79)** (7.59)**
Zero Coupon (Dummy) 0.036 0.093 0.079 0.037 0.016
(2.59)** (7.88)** (8.33)** (2.44)* (0.86)
Semiannual (Dummy) 0.002 0.041 0.036 -0.005 0.022
(0.32) (6.53)** (7.20)** (0.51) (2.80)**
Constant 0.176 0.104 -0.192 -2.481 -3.293
(6.46)** (4.95)** (10.05)** (31.38)** (48.13)**
Observations 114272 125665 239937 114272 114272
Number of group(quarter) 26 26 26 26 26
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 12: Fama-Macbeth regressions for the drivers of Liquidity: This table shows the result of Fama-Macbeth
regressions using three different measures of liquidity using three different measures of liquidity on the sample of bonds consisting
of the State Street Corporation custody database from January, 2000 to June, 2006. All variables are measured at a quarterly
frequency. The liquidity variables used are the latent liquidity of the bond at the beginning of the quarter, the number of trades
in a given bond in a quarter, and the quarterly volume of trading in terms of market value. The trading volume and trade count
measures used here are based on information available from the database of State Street holdings, since there is no trading
information available on TRACE prior to July, 2002. Ratings are based on the Moody’s classification scheme represented as a
cardinal scale: Aaa-1 Aa-2 A-3 Baa-4 and below Baa - 5. The liquidity variables are represented in terms of percentile values.
In order to compute percentile values, we rank the bonds for each quarter in terms of the liquidity measures and divide by the
number of bonds for which information is available for that measure for that particular quarter. Maturity dummies represent
whether the bond had an original maturity of 5 years, 7 years, 10 years or 30 years. The remaining variables are self-explanatory.
The regressions take the form of Fama-Macbeth regressions with the quarter for which the liquidity is measured as the grouping
variable. This is done so as to account for the fact that residuals within each bond may be correlated across quarters.
Latent Liquidity Trade Count Trade Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded Non-Traded All Traded Traded
Log (Amt OS) 0.0164 0.0097 0.0311 0.1551 0.1835
(10.629)** (9.348)** (28.125)** (46.174)** (59.837)**
Age (Years) -0.0133 -0.0042 -0.0105 -0.0134 -0.0206
(-26.598)** (-8.445)** (-49.350)** (-27.339)** (-27.530)**
Rating 0.0369 0.0309 0.0391 0.0341 0.0780
(10.414)** (19.597)** (26.492)** (13.419)** (38.397)**
Coupon 0.0036 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0038 0.0070
(4.015)** (1.427) (2.151)* (-5.035)** (7.669)**
Maturity (Years) -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0002
(-2.406)* (3.392)** (-0.125) (-3.085)** (-1.317)
Maturity 5 (Dummy) 0.0555 0.075 0.0723 -0.0050 0.0150
(29.241)** (19.608)** (29.788)** (-1.519) (5.200)**
Maturity 7 (Dummy) 0.0237 0.0495 0.0414 -0.0213 0.0119
(10.519)** (11.95)** (17.580)** (-8.077)** (5.168)**
Maturity 10 (Dummy) -0.0199 -0.0195 -0.0207 -0.0201 0.0059
(-11.976)** (-14.054)** (-17.229)** (-8.383)** (2.690)*
Maturity 30 (Dummy) -0.0379 -0.0355 -0.0472 0.0136 0.0109
(-12.324)** (-10.779)** (-19.616)** (4.159)** (3.301)**
Financial Sector (Dummy) 0.0007 0.0172 0.0017 -0.0314 -0.0553
(0.194) (5.671)** (0.942) (-9.080)** (-19.074)**
Industrial Sector (Dummy) -0.0225 -0.0103 -0.0212 -0.0267 -0.0384
(-7.314)** (-3.196)** (-7.916)** (-9.499)** (-16.990)**
Utilities (Dummy) -0.0009 0.002 -0.0151 -0.0326 -0.0642
(-0.316) (0.621) (-5.704)** (-6.317)** (-23.370)**
Private Placement (Dummy) 0.0325 0.0056 0.0065 -0.0098 -0.0529
(13.253)** (1.211) (2.068)* (-2.473)* (-12.873)**
Convertible (Dummy) 0.0181 0.0992 0.0168 -0.1524 -0.1221
(1.182) (9.334)** (1.147) (-13.990)** (-7.762)**
Callable (Dummy) 0.0313 0.0139 0.0376 0.0195 0.0901
(8.193)** (4.153)** (10.397)** (2.940)** (16.790)**
Putable (Dummy) 0.0698 0.0735 0.0581 -0.0354 -0.0493
(12.879)** (19.791)** (17.093)** (-4.363)** (-5.990)**
Variable Interest (Dummy) -0.0161 0.0259 0.0010 0.0298 -0.0154
(-5.521)** (2.962)** (0.187) (3.965)** (-4.001)**
Floating Interest (Dummy) -0.0465 0.0274 -0.0116 0.0619 -0.0987
(-5.388)** (4.191)** (-3.466)** (4.778)** (-6.342)**
Zero Coupon (Dummy) 0.0263 0.0631 0.0640 0.0441 0.0281
(1.908) (4.252)** (6.447)** (2.709)* (1.453)
Semiannual (Dummy) 0.0108 0.0339 0.0334 0.0008 0.0237
(1.162) (5.72)** (6.522)** (0.083) (2.871)**
Constant 0.1837 0.1284 -0.1894 -2.5508 -3.3668
(6.301)** (7.889)** (-11.792)** (-37.094)** (-54.116)**
R-squared 0.16 0.07 0.1565 0.2757 0.4038
Observations 114272 125665 239937 114272 114272
Number of group(quarter) 26 26 26 26 26
Fama-Macbeth t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 13: Significance of coefficients in Fama-Macbeth regressions: This table shows the relative number
of positive, positive significant (at the 5% level), negative and negative significant coefficients that result in Fama-
Macbeth regressions reported in table 12, using three different measures of liquidity on the sample of bonds consisting
of the State Street Corporation custody database from January, 2000 to June, 2006. All variables are measured at a
quarterly frequency. The liquidity variables used are the latent liquidity of the bond at the beginning of the quarter,
the number of trades in a given bond in a quarter, and the quarterly volume of trading in terms of market value. The
trading volume and trade count measures used here are based on information available from the database of State
Street holdings, since there is no trading information available on TRACE prior to July, 2002. Ratings are based on
the Moody’s classification scheme represented as a cardinal scale: Aaa-1 Aa-2 A-3 Baa-4 and below Baa - 5. The
liquidity variables are represented in terms of percentile values. In order to compute percentile values, we rank the
bonds for each quarter in terms of the liquidity measures and divide by the number of bonds for which information is
available for that measure for that particular quarter. Maturity dummies represent whether the bond had an original
maturity of 5 years, 7 years, 10 years or 30 years. The remaining variables are self-explanatory. The regressions take
the form of Fama-Macbeth regressions with the quarter for which the liquidity is measured as the grouping variable.
This is done so as to account for the fact that residuals within each bond may be correlated across quarters.
Latent Liquidity Trade volume Trade count
Traded Non-Traded All Traded Traded
pos/ neg/ pos/ neg/ pos/ neg/ pos/ neg/ pos/ neg/
sig sig sig sig sig sig sig sig sig sig
Log (Amt OS) 26 0 25 1 26 0 26 0 26 0
25 0 22 0 26 0 26 0 26 0
Age (Years) 0 26 1 25 0 26 0 26 0 26
0 26 0 21 0 26 0 26 0 26
Rating 26 0 26 0 26 0 26 0 26 0
23 0 26 0 26 0 26 0 26 0
Coupon 19 7 18 8 18 8 2 24 26 0
8 0 12 6 13 6 1 9 16 0
Maturity (Years) 9 17 18 8 12 14 9 17 10 16
1 8 6 0 6 5 0 4 1 5
Maturity 5 (Dummy) 26 0 26 0 26 0 11 15 21 5
26 0 26 0 26 0 1 5 5 0
Maturity 7 (Dummy) 25 1 26 0 26 0 0 26 21 5
16 0 19 0 25 0 0 6 0 0
Maturity 10 (Dummy) 0 26 0 26 0 26 0 26 18 8
0 16 0 14 0 25 0 17 5 0
Maturity 30 (Dummy) 0 26 0 26 0 26 20 6 21 5
0 22 0 17 0 26 5 0 1 1
Financial Sector (Dummy) 14 12 24 2 15 11 2 24 0 26
8 4 7 0 1 0 0 17 0 25
Industrial Sector (Dummy) 2 24 7 19 2 24 2 24 0 26
0 15 0 8 0 18 0 19 0 24
Utilities (Dummy) 11 15 15 11 3 23 3 23 0 26
3 1 1 2 0 13 1 17 0 25
Private Placement (Dummy) 26 0 14 12 18 8 8 18 0 26
17 0 7 4 6 4 1 5 0 24
Convertible (Dummy) 15 11 26 0 15 11 0 26 4 22
10 9 22 0 12 9 0 23 0 19
Callable (Dummy) 26 0 20 6 26 0 19 7 26 0
20 0 7 0 25 0 12 4 26 0
Putable (Dummy) 26 0 26 0 26 0 7 19 4 22
22 0 26 0 26 0 0 11 0 12
Variable Interest (Dummy) 3 23 15 11 14 12 18 8 5 21
0 1 5 0 2 2 9 0 0 2
Floating Interest (Dummy) 2 24 19 7 6 20 22 4 3 23
0 13 5 0 0 0 11 0 0 16
Zero Coupon (Dummy) 18 8 21 5 21 5 19 7 13 13
3 3 11 2 16 0 5 2 4 3
Semiannual (Dummy) 15 11 24 2 26 0 15 11 17 9
4 2 5 0 7 0 1 4 1 1
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Table 14: Univariate Regressions of Transactions costs and price impacts on Latent Liquidity: This
table shows, quarter by quarter, univariate regressions of the transaction costs estimates and of Amihud’s ILLIQ
measure of price impact calculated using TRACE data for a given quarter for a bond and its percentile rank (from
0 to 1) on the basis of latent liquid. The transaction costs are estimated using a limited dependent variable model
for every bond for every quarter using the 5 year interest rate and the return on the S&P index as benchmarks. The
percentile rank of latent liquidity is computed by ranking bonds every month in terms of latent liquidity and then
dividing the bonds by the number of bonds available for that month. The first rank is given to the lowest liquidity
security. This gives us a measure that is comparable from month to month. The sample consists of bonds that are
traded on TRACE for a minimum of five days every quarter, and for whom information on latent liquidity is available
from the State Street Corporation holdings database. The time period covered is July 2002 to June 2006.
Transaction costs (% of price) Log(ILLIQ)
Latent Liquidity Constant R-squared Latent Liquidity Constant R-squared
Q302 -0.439 0.469 0.01 -1.998 -10.988 0.02
(1.22) (1.74) (2.11)* (15.72)**
Q402 -0.953 0.858 0.02 1.136 -13.018 0.01
(2.24)* (2.65)** (1.44) (21.69)**
Q103 -0.608 0.946 0.01 -4.087 -8.916 0.13
(2.60)** (6.37)** (9.44)** (32.86)**
Q203 -1.422 1.686 0.03 -3.599 -9.207 0.12
(4.24)** (8.09)** (9.60)** (39.57)**
Q303 -2.059 2.103 0.05 -3.394 -9.271 0.11
(5.95)** (10.14)** (9.29)** (42.52)**
Q403 -2.217 2.209 0.05 -2.979 -9.448 0.09
(6.15)** (10.43)** (8.73)** (47.21)**
Q104 -2.303 2.065 0.05 -3.745 -9.499 0.09
(6.48)** (10.31)** (8.88)** (39.91)**
Q204 -2.617 2.367 0.05 -4.209 -9.136 0.11
(6.73)** (10.57)** (10.22)** (38.71)**
Q304 -2.530 2.452 0.04 -3.114 -9.901 0.06
(6.17)** (10.18)** (7.46)** (40.14)**
Q404 -2.801 2.971 0.06 -1.994 -10.131 0.03
(9.84)** (16.82)** (7.56)** (62.39)**
Q105 -2.232 2.934 0.03 -1.129 -10.667 0.01
(7.11)** (14.74)** (4.23)** (63.05)**
Q205 -2.235 2.906 0.03 -1.350 -10.237 0.02
(6.19)** (12.53)** (5.41)** (63.90)**
Q305 -2.284 2.950 0.03 -1.581 -10.196 0.03
(6.53)** (13.03)** (6.12)** (60.94)**
Q405 -1.898 2.680 0.02 -1.224 -10.290 0.01
(5.19)** (11.38)** (4.40)** (57.53)**
Q106 -3.016 3.284 0.04 -1.514 -10.265 0.02
(7.08)** (11.62)** (4.77)** (48.69)**
Q206 -2.240 2.916 0.02 -1.694 -9.998 0.03
(5.40)** (10.49)** (5.49)** (48.32)**
Overall -2.024 2.460 0.03 -2.171 -9.977 0.04
(21.24)** (40.91)** (25.82)** (188.51)**
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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